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Responding to a pandemic
While the size and form of the COVID-19 pandemic in African 
states cannot be accurately predicted, it is clear that its effects will be 
significant. At the time of writing, most African governments were 
urgently responding in order to contain and mitigate the pandemic. 
In South Africa (SA), the crisis has sparked a number of initiatives, 
including several intersectoral co-ordination efforts such as a block 
exemption from the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 for firms in the 
healthcare sector, in order to respond quickly and at scale to the novel 
coronavirus.[1]
One SA initiative was the establishment and regulation of a 
COVID-19 Tracing Database on 2 April 2020, building on the earlier 
development in March that linked a range of data warehouses as 
a research tool at the Council for Scientific and Industry Research 
(CSIR), a public body.[2,3] The purpose of the Tracing Database is ‘to 
enable the tracing of persons who are known or reasonably suspected 
to have come into contact with any person known or reasonably 
suspected to have contracted COVID-19’.
Case and case-contact tracing and isolation are important in 
responding to the pandemic. They also comprise one of the essential 
elements of an exit strategy for a phased lifting of lockdown regulations, 
which have serious structural and long-term consequences for the 
economy and society. As well as these rewards, there are risks and 
potential dangers with the establishment of the database. Contact 
tracing through the collection of mobile data in order to identify 
and locate individuals necessarily involves a serious invasion of the 
constitutional right to privacy.
The establishment of the database also heightens the implications 
of the ethical choices made by professionals and others in the 
medical community attempting to ensure a balance between dealing 
with a public health crisis on the one hand and protecting privacy 
on the other. While we do not directly address the ethical tensions 
presented by the pandemic in clinical settings, others have recently 
done so.[4] Doctors as custodians of patient-provider confidentiality 
should be thinking about the issues of public policy raised by the 
establishment of the Tracing Database and how it may play out 
going forward. Indeed, they need to disclose to the patients they 
are testing or sending for testing for SARS-CoV-2 that the patients’ 
information will be disclosed to the database and kept confidential.[5] 
While current National Institute for Communicable Diseases contact 
tracing guidance incorporates ethical codes and confidentiality, it 
does not specifically take into account or reflect the establishment of 
the Tracing Database.[6] One specific recommendation flowing from 
our analysis is that this guidance should be revised in light of the 
database’s establishment.
Beyond the immediate rewards and risks and the ethical issues 
presented, the establishment of the Tracing Database has potentially 
long-term consequences in fields such as law enforcement and 
financial services, as well as public health. It is therefore important 
to understand the establishment of the Tracing Database and to 
identify the specific limits and controls contained in the empowering 
regulations for it. After doing so, we further discuss the risks 
and rewards of the database, with specific attention to issues of 
privacy and ethics, and conclude by suggesting that its mode of 
implementation will be crucial to its success.
The COVID-19 Tracing Database
The Tracing Database includes information on names, identity or 
passport numbers, cellphone numbers and test results of persons 
tested for COVID-19 and their known or suspected contacts. Data 
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are generated for this system from private and public laboratories 
and testing facilities, places of accommodation, and, perhaps most 
significantly, electronic communications service providers. For the 
first time, SA mobile phone companies have been placed under a 
generally applicable legal obligation to provide customer information 
to a state surveillance scheme. Mobile phone operators are required to 
promptly provide ‘the location or movements of any person known or 
reasonably suspected to have contracted COVID-19; and the location 
or movements of any person known or reasonably suspected to have 
come into contact, during the period 5 March 2020 to the date on 
which the National State of Disaster has lapsed or has been terminated, 
with [such persons]’.[2] The data provided are likely to reproduce any 
errors currently captured by the operators under the terms of the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002. Similarly, the 
geographical data available from cellular service tower records will 
cover large areas. In both cases, it is important that the data subject 
have access to processes that can review and correct errors.
The legal regulations establishing the Tracing Database (see below) 
clearly envision and authorise the use of individualised data for 
contact tracing. Significantly and interestingly, this use goes beyond 
the initial reported intention of the CSIR – to aggregate location 
data for analytical purposes to provide evidence for rational crisis 
response and policy-making.
Below we discuss possible rights violations and ethical implications 
associated with the use of this location and movement information 
for case and case contact tracing.
The institutional and legal precedent for this reporting is the 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. Notification has been relied 
upon as a method to track and control communicable diseases and 
manage outbreaks, and has had success.[7] Nonetheless, a series of 
recent studies has raised questions about the efficacy of this system 
in SA and internationally, noting poor perceptions of the system by 
stakeholders, lack of compliance by healthcare providers, and other 
concerns.[8-10]
Privacy protections
A significant design feature of the Tracing Database is its built-in 
privacy protections. The information in the database is confidential 
and may only be used for the contact tracing purpose, and there 
are penalties for disclosure. The database is to incorporate all 
contact tracing information obtained from the mobile phone 
operators. If information obtained is not relevant to the database 
purpose, the National Department of Health (NDoH) may not retain 
that information beyond a period of 6 weeks. Furthermore, the 
information contained in the database must be de-identified within 6 
weeks of the termination of the national State of Disaster and retained 
thereafter only for research, teaching and study purposes.[2]
Perhaps the most significant and certainly the most prominent 
privacy protection is the establishment of a COVID-19 Designated 
Judge to receive weekly reports on the location and movements 
information received from the mobile phone operators, as well as 
to recommend and report upon the winding down of the Tracing 
Database. Moreover, in what may well lead to notification to 
individual persons of their having being surveilled, the Judge is 
authorised ‘to give directions as to any further steps to be taken 
to protect the right to privacy of those persons whose data has 
been collected, which directions must be complied with’. This last-
mentioned power apart, the Designated Judge is perhaps more 
akin to a judge heading a judicial commission of inquiry than 
those judges adjudicating on warrant requests in terms of SA’s 
operative surveillance law.[11] Other than receiving weekly reports 
and making directions upon receiving the final winding-up report, 
the chief power and function of the Designated Judge is to suggest 
improvements to the Tracing Database directly to Cabinet through a 
recommendation and regulation amendment process provided for in 
Regulation 11H(15).[2]
In the SA legal context, the Tracing Database takes place under 
a legislatively authorised National State of Disaster (not a State of 
Emergency) in a constitutional democracy. As detailed above, its 
institutional protections for privacy are significant. Nonetheless, 
the Tracing Database poses risks both to the rule of law and to 
the protection of individual rights at the same time as it offers 
opportunities for an effective pandemic response. The relevant 
Minister’s declaration of a National State of Disaster authorises her 
to issue regulations together with other ministers in various sectors 
and provides for ‘directives’ by such ministers.[12] One safeguard is 
that these regulations and directives and actions taken in their terms 
will need to be justifiable under the Bill of Rights and survive judicial 
scrutiny under the principle of legality (or the administrative justice 
statute if the regulations are deemed to constitute administrative 
action). However, there may be a strong case for ex post legislative 
controls in the form of a parliamentary reporting requirement, in 
part to facilitate public deliberation and education on such issues of 
great import and long-term significance.
SA has experience establishing and applying the standards 
of lawfulness to wide, broad, and potentially vague grants of 
discretionary power under the two States of Emergency in the 
1980s (which demonstrated the real dangers of the persistence 
of ‘temporary’ rights-infringing measures).[13] Progressive lawyers 
made very creative challenges to the emergency regulations without 
the aid of a Bill of Rights, such as the SA Constitution now 
includes. [14] Medical professionals also at times directly responded to 
the States of Emergency and their effects on health.[15-17] The current 
political and legal context is substantially different – a constitutional 
democracy responding to a public health crisis, not an instance of 
state repression. The COVID-19 National State of Disaster is the first 
time in our post-apartheid history that there have been such broad 
grants of discretionary powers to government officials. Yet the state 
must comply with constitutional standards of legality and rights. So 
far, indications are that courts will exercise extreme caution before 
intervening, at least for as long as the state can give assurances 
that it is acting on the basis of scientific evidence and the advice of 
healthcare professionals. We have, however, already seen instances 
of the abuse of policing powers. So the question of the approach 
the courts will adopt to enforcement of the rule of law and rights 
protection under a ‘State of Disaster’ is critically important.
Regulating the risks and rewards of 
the tracing database
The Tracing Database initiative occupies an emerging global 
regulatory space, at the intersection of public health, constitutional 
rights during emergencies and disasters, credit surveillance, open 
data, and information privacy.[18-22] Widespread laws, including the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 in SA, have provided a legal basis 
for individualised surveillance in the field of credit and finance. The 
emerging global regulatory guidance for the COVID-19 pandemic is 
fairly clear that aggregated data, with appropriate restrictions, can and 
should be used as far as effective in order to combat the pandemic 
and calibrate mitigation and anti-transmission measures. [19,23] While 
still emerging, this regulatory guidance emphasises that uses of 
individualised data infringe upon rights and therefore, for instance, 
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recommends that any use of contact tracing applications be 
voluntary. [24] The SA regulator charged with data protection has issued 
a Guidance Note addressing the Tracing Database which stipulates 
that the mobile phone operators should provide location-based data 
of data subjects if such provision complies with an obligation imposed 
by law (such as the regulations described above).[25] However, ‘the 
Government must still comply with all the applicable conditions for 
the lawful processing as set out in this Guidance Note’.[25]
The use of individualised data, as in the Tracing Database, poses 
higher privacy and ethical concerns than the use of aggregated data. 
It may also have different, more targeted, and in certain situations 
more effective impacts. It is therefore worthwhile to identify specific 
uses to which the Tracing Database could be put that would raise 
very high concerns of privacy and other rights concerns. One such 
example might be in relation to mandated quarantines.[26,27] Data in the 
Tracing Database might be shared with law enforcement to monitor 
and enforce compliance by individuals with mandated quarantines. 
Most legal commentators feel that health officials ‘would be justified 
in the public interest, in arresting and detaining, quarantining or 
isolating, any person who is suspected or is carrying a communicable 
disease’.[28] One SA court has grappled with quarantine in the context 
of drug-resistant tuberculosis.[29] A rights-respecting Tracing Database 
will require sensitive, informed and non-violent implementation of 
restrictions of persons’ movements if they are found to be possibly 
infected or able to infect others. Medical professionals will inevitably 
be faced with choices for which there is no specific regulatory or 
ethical guidance. The mode of rights-regarding and ethically aware 
implementation we are calling for has been demonstrably lacking in 
numerous reported actions of the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) and the police to date. The deployment of additional 
SANDF troops to police the lockdown and reports of cases of abuse of 
power underline how important it is to protect individuals’ rights.[30-32]
After establishment
Actions taken to implement the Tracing Database will be crucial 
to its success and its social reception. Indeed, technological and 
regulatory choices will be at the same time critical and inevitably 
political. Whether those charged with building and using the CSIR 
databases focus on the use of call detail records (which provide the 
billing details of voice calls) or usage detail records (which specify 
the connections between phone devices and the cellular providers’ 
towers without requiring voice calls), the surveillance will be able to 
create origin-destination matrices, dwell estimations and hotspots, 
time at work/home estimates, and contact matrices. These should 
equip the NDoH and the SA government with a central point to 
read the progress of the pandemic and its recession on a national 
scale.[19] Real-time phone metadata – which had been available 
to the police with a judicial warrant under existing surveillance 
laws[33] – are being combined with the existing notifiable disease 
regime. The obligation imposed on the telecommunications firms 
by the regulation may produce a real-time government surveillance 
database for the first time. The development of and adherence to 
standards of privacy protection and ethics in implementing a large 
limited-duration government-led project such as this one requires 
appropriate investment, systems, and confidentiality agreements as 
well as good technical warehouse capacity. The experience of the 
Competition Commission’s Health Market Inquiry in obtaining, 
deidentifying, analysing and safeguarding personal information in 
the healthcare sector may well be helpful here.[34]
Over and above attention to the critical choices to be made in the 
implementation of the Tracing Database, we argue that oversight 
on rights infringements is as important. Current safeguards do not 
actively involve civil society, including structures of the medical 
professions. Many civil society organisations are currently active 
during the State of Disaster,[35] and could be central to the database 
implementation process in order both to safeguard rights and to 
ensure the efficacy of contact tracing through bolstered public trust 
and legitimacy. The CSIR and the NDoH should work actively to 
involve civil society in the implementation of the database as well 
as in the foreseen activities of research after the State of Disaster. 
Fundamentally we argue that while the public may tolerate this 
degree of invasion of privacy under particular circumstances, there is 
a danger that it will become normalised, and the exceptional nature 
of infringements of individual rights needs to be underscored. Public 
debate, participation, and education on these privacy and ethical 
issues is important in a rights-based constitutional democracy. In our 
view, healthcare providers and their organisations have a particular 
responsibility to ensure that rights violations are avoided during this 
pandemic. Other states in the rest of Africa and in the rest of the 
world may be able to learn and adapt from the SA response,[32] as 
well as to contribute their own experience and knowledge to improve 
the SA response and to develop a repertoire of context-specific and 
effective responses to the pandemic.
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